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Abstract ’Sensing the self’ relies on the ability to dis-
tinguish self-generated from external stimuli. It requires
functioning mechanisms to establish feelings of agency and
ownership. Agency is defined causally, where the subjects
action is followed by an effect. Ownership is defined by the
features of the effect, independent from the action. In our
study, we manipulated these qualities separately. 13 right-
handed healthy individuals performed the experiment
while 76-channel EEG was recorded. Stimuli consisted of
visually presented words, read aloud by the subject. The
experiment consisted of six conditions: (a) subjects saw a
word, read it aloud, heard it in their own voice; (b) like a,
but the word was heard in an unfamiliar voice; (c) subject
heard a word in his/her own voice without speaking;
(d) like c, but the word was heard in an unfamiliar voice;
(e) like a, but subjects heard the word with a delay;
(f) subjects read without hearing. ERPs and difference
maps were computed for all conditions. Effects were ana-
lysed topographically. The N100 (86–172 ms) displayed
significant main effects of agency and ownership. The
topographies of the two effects shared little common var-
iance, suggesting independent effects. Later effects
(174–400 ms) of agency and ownership were
topographically similar, suggesting common mechanisms.
Replicating earlier studies, significant N100 suppression
was observed, with a topography resembling the agency
effect. ‘Sensing the self’ appears to recruit from at least
two very distinct processes: an agency assessment that
represents causality and an ownership assessment that
compares stimulus features with memory content.
Keywords Language  Self-monitoring  Corollary
discharge  Healthy controls  Auditory evoked potential 
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Introduction
Credible indexing that ‘I am the initiator of my actions’ is
important for distinguishing self-generated stimuli from
external stimuli. In the 1950s, Sperry (1950) and Holst
(1954) followed the early ideas of Helmholtz (1924) and
Hughlings Jackson (1958) of a ‘‘motor theory of thought’’.
They suggested a motor-driven efference copy mechanism
towards the sensory brain areas that allows the detection of
differences between incoming sensory feedback with the
internal representation. The predicted sensory consequence
is called corollary discharge (Ford and Mathalon 2012). An
important paper, which consolidated these concepts of ef-
ference copy and corollary discharge in the psychiatric
literature and linked it explicitly with psychotic symptoms
was the work of Feinberg (1978), who hypothesized that
this mechanisms of control and integration are not only
present in the motor system but also in thinking. He
speculated that the derangement of corollary discharge
could produce many of the symptoms of schizophrenia.
Although the terms efference copy and corollary dis-
charge are often used interchangeably or jointly (Feinberg
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1978), some authors (Crapse and Sommer 2008; Ford and
Mathalon 2012) distinguished between them. ‘‘Efference
copy’’ is used to refer to a copy of the motor command and
‘‘corollary discharge’’ to the expected sensation resulting
from this particular action. Beside the human studies,
research in many species suggests that these mechanisms
allow all species in the animal kingdom to tag sensations as
coming from ‘‘self’’ (Crapse and Sommer 2008).
The idea of sensory predictions based on an efference
copy is discussed for sensory-motor integration in modal-
ities such as visual (Wurtz 2008), auditory-verbal (Heinks-
Maldonado et al. 2007; Houde and Jordan 1998), and
somatosensory systems (Blakemore et al. 2002). It also is
believed that the brain generally uses the same mechanisms
for visuo- (Leube et al. 2003) or audio-motor (Maidhof
et al. 2010) integration. These predictive mechanisms help
us to distinguish our own actions from those of others.
An excellent example of a deficient system of sensing the
self is observed in individuals with psychotic disorders such
as schizophrenia. In hearing voices, thought insertion,
withdrawal, made volition, impulses or affects, derealisation
and depersonalisation, a lack of the ability to correctly dis-
tinguish self-generated from external stimuli, might be part
of the neurophysiological deficit. Certainly, other specific
deficits also contribute to the respective full symptom (e.g. a
pathological activation of the auditory cortex in auditory
verbal hallucinations) (Dierks et al. 1999).
In schizophrenia, core symptoms are found in the verbal
domain. Therefore, our main interest is in predictive
mechanisms in the verbal system. In healthy subjects, the
intact functions of predictive verbal mechanisms are
important for the acquisition of speech and speech fluency.
Neurobiologically, these mechanisms are realized by an
intact and cooperating motor and sensory language system.
Specifically, an efference copy from the frontal motor
speech area is sent towards the specific temporo-parietal
sensory areas. The efference copy of the motor speech
command predicts the sensory consequences, namely the
corollary discharge, and consequently, what will be heard.
Subsequently, the brain compares the corollary discharge
with the actual incoming acoustic stimulus. In case of
consistency, the internal prediction matches the self-gen-
erated sensory input. As a consequence, the activation of
the auditory cortex is dampened, and in healthy controls
the suppression of the electrophysiological N1 component
(i.e. the answer of the primary auditory cortex to an
acoustic stimulus) reflects the consequences of the corol-
lary discharge generated during speaking and listening by
the efference copy (Houde et al. 2002; Pantev et al. 1988).
It has been demonstrated that the N1 responses to a self-
produced and, thus, expected vowel/a/were weaker than
responses to the same, tape-recorded/a/. This finding sup-
ports the hypothesis of an exact prediction of the expected
incoming stimulus by the efference copy (Houde et al.
2002). When feedback has been manipulated by giving
back a stimulus that does not exactly match the expectation
(e.g. altering or replacing the voice speaking/a/), the N1
suppression is reduced or even missing (Heinks-Maldona-
do et al. 2005). This suppression seems to depend on the
degree of the alteration of the stimulus: Matching and thus
expected stimuli lead—as we already know—to a maximal
suppression. Alien or maximal altered stimuli go along
without suppression, and stepwise graded altered stimuli
merge with the amount of alteration into a stepwise
diminishing suppression (Behroozmand and Larson 2011).
Intact efference copying implies that the initiator of an
act owns the results of it. To understand the processes
contributing to this complicated system, we introduce
definitions of two comprised concepts, namely agency and
ownership. The proposed definition of agency is causal; the
subjects action (being the cause) is followed by an effect
within a precise time window. This does not imply much
about the nature of the effect: For example, if I push the
light switch, and the TV, but not the light goes on, I still
feel I have caused it, albeit the effect was unexpected.
Ownership is defined by the features of the effect, inde-
pendent from the action of the subject. I may for example
immediately recognize my writing, even if I’m not able to
remember that I wrote it. In a healthy condition, the subject
attributes both agency and ownership to the effects of its
own actions: There is a strong feeling of having initiated
the effect, and the effect contains features that unequivo-
cally attribute it to past, self-initiated experiences of a
similar kind. In the context of our experiment, agency was
therefore defined as hearing a word immediately after
reading a word, independent of the acoustic features of the
heard word. On the other hand, ownership was defined as
whether the stimulus contained acoustic features that
clearly attributed it to the past experiences of hearing one’s
own voice. Agency was thus assumed to be present if and
only if the subject’s auditory experience was precisely
time-locked to the subject’s act of speaking, and absent if
such a precise temporal relation was absent or distorted
(here: delayed). Ownership was assumed to be present if
and only if the subject heard a word with her/his own
voice, and absent when hearing an unfamiliar voice.
Our distinctive definitions of agency and ownership are
interesting also in the context of a recently proposed the-
oretical framework (Synofzik et al. 2013) that distin-
guishes, when explaining ‘‘feeling of self’’, predictive
processes that are based on causality and assumingly yield
a ‘‘feeling of agency’’, and post-dictive processes, that
compare sensory input with memory based information.
These post-dictive processes were assumed to correspond
to a ‘‘judgement of agency’’, which contains our definition
of ‘‘ownership’’.
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In summary, behaviourally evident functional and dys-
functional self-monitoring seems to depend on several
biological mechanisms (Johns and Mcguire 1999). These
mechanisms may independently yield a sense of ownership
and agency of perceptions. In the present study, we intro-
duce a novel experimental design to disentangle the bio-
logical substrates of agency and ownership contributing to
the ‘sense of self’. We aimed to investigate the contribution
of these two processes on ‘sensing the self’ by analysing
event related potential (ERP) components from a healthy
control sample. We hypothesized that the two processes are
different from each other as seen by different topographies
and that both processes contribute to an intact recognition
of self-caused actions.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Subjects included 13 healthy right-handed adults (6 men),
ranging in age from 19 to 34 years (mean = 24.1,
SD = 3.4). Medical and psychiatric disorders were asses-
sed by questionnaire and served as exclusion criteria. No
subjects reported a history of auditory, visual, psychiatric,
or neurological disorders. All study procedures, including
recruitment, data acquisition, and informed consent, were
arranged by the Department of Psychiatric Neurophysiol-
ogy of the University Hospital of Psychiatry Bern. Subjects
were compensated with a voucher for their participation.
Before the electrophysiological measurements, subjects
passed the Whispered-Voice Test (Macphee et al. 1988) to
screen for hearing impairments. All subjects provided
written informed consent and the study was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Study proto-
col was approved by the local ethics committee of the
Canton of Bern.
Experimental Design and Stimulus Material
The experiment allowed separating the effects of agency
and ownership on auditory word perception and eliminate
the effects of overt speech production. In its basic form, it
consisted of visually presented words that had to be read
immediately, and instantly perceived by the reader/speaker.
However, due to reasons described below, not all stimulus
conditions contained both a visual and an auditory com-
ponent (Table 1).
The experiment consisted of the following 6 conditions:
(a) subjects saw a word, read it aloud, and immediately
(without delay) heard it in their own voice (Normal);
(b) subjects saw a word, read it aloud, and immediately
heard it spoken by another, unfamiliar voice (Unfamiliar);
(c) without seeing and reading a word, the subject heard
him/herself speaking a word (Feedback-Only); (d) without
seeing and reading a word, subjects heard an unfamiliar
voice speaking a word (Feedback-Unfamiliar); (e) subjects
saw a word, read it aloud, and heard the word in their own
voice, but with a delay of 200 ms (Delay); and finally,
(f) subjects saw a word and read it aloud, but received no
auditory feedback (Read-Aloud-Only). This condition was
used to control for speech-related artefact elimination
(Table 1).During the experiment, the subjects wore head-
phones and sat in a comfortable resting position in front of
computer monitor (distance 70 cm) and a microphone in a
slightly darkened room. Throughout the experiment, a
fixation cross was shown in the centre of the screen except
for when a word was presented. Visual stimuli consisted of
270 two-syllable, concrete, and neutral nouns. We con-
trolled for equality in frequency, word length, and gender
(male, female, neutral) within and among the blocks. The
words and their concreteness ratings were selected from a
word list from Wirth (Wirth et al. 2008, 2011). In each trial
that included a visual word presentation, the word was
shown for one second (visual angle of a 5-letter word was
4.9 degrees). There were a total of 90 trials in each of the
six conditions, making a total of 540 trials. Each of the 270
Table 1 The stimulation conditions: The six conditions are listed and
briefly described
Name Description Agency Ownership
Normal Subjects saw a word, read it
aloud, and immediately heard
it in their own voice
1 1
Unfamiliar Subjects saw a word, read it
aloud, and immediately heard
it, but spoken with an
unfamiliar voice
1 2
Feedback-
Only
Without seeing and reading a
word, the subject heard him/
herself speaking a word
2 1
Unfamiliar-
Only
Without seeing and reading a
word, subjects heard an
unfamiliar voice speaking a
word
2 2
Delay Subjects saw a word, read it
aloud, and heard the word in
their own voice, but with a
delay of 200 ms
– 1
Read-
Aloud-
Only
Subjects saw a word and read it
aloud, but received no
auditory feedback. This
condition was used to control
for speech-related artefact
2 2
Agency and ownership effects are indicated for each condition with
?for the presence of the respective effect and - for the absence. In
the Delay condition the presence of a distorted the agency effect is
indicated with –
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words was therefore employed twice in the same condition,
except of the words from conditions Normal and Feedback-
Only where 90 different words appeared in each of the two
conditions, but where identical for both conditions. In the
Unfamiliar condition, the subject’s voice onset was
detected through the microphone, which triggered the
playback of the visually presented word read by an unfa-
miliar speaker. There was no intentional delay between
voice onset and the playback of the unfamiliar voice and
subjects reported hearing the feedback in ‘‘real-time’’
without perceptible delay. The auditory stimuli for the
Feedback-Only condition consisted of the words read (and
recorded) by the subject during the Normal condition. The
auditory stimuli for the Feedback-Unfamiliar condition
consisted of words spoken by a local speaker who was the
same sex as the subject (recorded before the experiment).
Each trial consisted of a 1-s pre-stimulus period with only
the fixation cross, followed by the presentation of a visual
stimulus and an auditory feedback, or by the presentation of
an auditory stimulus. Subjects were instructed to read each
word on the screen aloud into the microphone. Trials were
presented in a pseudo-random order over the duration of the
whole experiment and separated by 3 s; 10 short breaks
were given during the experiment. The entire experiment
lasted about 35 min. For the analysis of the behavioral data,
the delays between stimulus and voice onset time were
individually collected in the Normal and Unfamiliar con-
ditions and averaged first within, then across subjects.
To mask unwanted direct auditory feedback, we used a
Sennheiser HME 110 headphone (designed for helicopter
pilots) to effectively dampen external auditory input. To
avoid feedback through bone conduction, a constant pink
(1/f) background noise was constantly played through the
headphones. Prior to the experiment, noise volume was
individually adjusted to be loud enough to mask bone
conductions when subjects spoke normally wearing the
headphones. Under experimental conditions, the loudness
of the presented word was set to 20 dB above the indi-
vidual pink noise level.
Electrophysiological Recordings
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using sil-
ver/silver chloride electrodes attached to the scalp at 74
regularly spaced standard positions of the international
extended ten-twenty system. Impedances were kept below
20 kX. For artefact monitoring, two additional EOG elec-
trodes were placed below each eye. F3 and F4, electrically
separated by buffer amplifiers, served as recording refer-
ences. Before starting the experiment, a 4-min resting state
EEG was recorded for clinical evaluation. During the entire
experiment, the EEG was continuously digitized (bandpass
filter 0.016–150 Hz, 500 Hz sampling rate) and stored for
offline analysis using a Nihon Kohden Neurofax EEG
1100G system. The onset of the visual presentation of each
stimulus, as well as the voice onset, was marked in the
EEG.
Data Pre-Processing
All EEG data were submitted to an ICA-based correction
of eye-movements (Jung et al. 2000). Thereafter, the EEG
was recomputed to average reference, and periods with
visually detectable remaining artefacts (namely muscle
activity and electrode artefacts) were eliminated by an EEG
expert. Channels containing excessive artefacts were
interpolated using spherical splines. All signals were band-
pass filtered between 5 and 18 Hz. Based on the markers
given by the stimulation programme, the continuous EEG
recordings were segmented into 1,200-ms epochs, begin-
ning 200 ms before voice/sound onset to 1,000 ms post-
onset. EEG segments were averaged within each stimulus
condition and subject (mean number of included trials per
condition was 83, range 64–90). To correct for speech-
related artefacts, the individual mean ERP of the Read-
Aloud-Only stimulus condition was subtracted from the
individual ERPs of the Normal, Unfamiliar, and Delay
conditions.
Statistical Analysis
The grand mean ERP was computed across all conditions
(Feedback-Only, Unfamiliar-Only, Normal, Unfamiliar,
Delay) and subjects and divided into temporal components
based on the grand mean’s dissimilarity. The ERP maps
were then averaged subject- and condition-wise across time
within each temporal component. The peaks of this curve
indicated end respectively start point of a particular time
window corresponding to separable, stable, and mathe-
matically defined ERP components (Michel et al. 2009).
The statistical comparison of the ERP component maps
was based on a randomization procedure called TANOVA
(Strik et al. 1998), as implemented in the Ragu programme
(Koenig et al. 2011). In brief, a TANOVA uses randomi-
zation statistics to compare multichannel ERP. Since a
TANOVA considers the entire scalp field as a single entity,
significant TANOVA effects imply at least partially dif-
ferent sources of the analysed ERP component maps. The
main analysis contrasted the four conditions Normal,
Feedback-Only, Unfamiliar, and Unfamiliar-Only along
the two orthogonal factors agency and ownership (see
Table 1). The factors followed a 2 9 2 design with con-
ditions Normal (agency ?/ownership ?), Feedback-Only
(agency-/ownership ?), Unfamiliar (agency ?/ownership-)
and Unfamiliar-Only (agency-/ownership-). One additional
one-way TANOVA contrasted the Feedback-Only
Brain Topogr (2014) 27:672–682 675
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condition against the Normal condition, aiming to replicate
the previously reported effects of the feed-forward pre-
diction mechanism (Ford et al. 2001a, b; Heinks-Maldo-
nado et al. 2005).
Finally, the Delay condition was contrasted with the
Normal condition to assess its effect.
Where there were significant (p \ 0.05) TANOVA
effects, they were followed up by t-maps to display the
spatial distribution of the encountered scalp map difference.
In order to estimate the putative sources of scalp ERP
effects attributable to agency or ownership, voxelwise
inverse statistics were computed for those components and
contrast where the TANOVA was significant. Intracerebral
current density was estimated using the sLORETA soft-
ware (Pascual-Marqui 2002) that used a boundary elements
head model derived from the MNI152 template, and a total
of 6,239 voxels of 5 9 595 mm size that covered all
cortical gray matter. The regularization parameter was set
to a SNR of 100. Paired t-statistics across subjects were
used to assess significance of local differences. Since the
overall null-hypothesis had had already been rejected
before computing a contrast in the inverse space, no further
corrections for multiple testing were applied. The obtained
t-values were thresholded at t-values corresponding to a
two-tailed significance level of 5 %. Local maxima and
their positions were reported in MNI coordinates.
Results
Behavioral Data
Mean voice onset time was 607.9 ms (sd: 46.1 ms) after
the onset of stimulus words. This is in close agreement with
previous literature (Gould et al. 2012) and indicates that
our subjects performed the task as instructed.
Segmentation of the Components
The temporal segmentation of the EEG components based
on spatial similarity as assessed by the correlation coeffi-
cient of the grand mean of the five conditions (Fig. 1). This
resulted in times periods from 20 to 84 ms for the early
component, 86–172 ms for the N100, and 174–400 ms for
the late component.
Early Component
The TANOVA indicated main effects of agency
(p = 0.040, tmax at Oz = 3.211, tmin at FC2 = -3.381)
and ownership (p = 0.006, tmax at AF7 = 4.715, tmin at
P2 = -3.203) as well as an interaction (p = 0.04, tmax at
F2 = 5.020, tmin at P9 = -3.699).
N100 Effects
For all conditions, the N100 topography in general
resembled the expected configuration with a central nega-
tivity and a bilateral temporal positivity (Fig. 2). There
were, however, considerable differences between condi-
tions, which were confirmed by significant effects in the
two-factorial TANOVA. In particular, the TANOVA
indicated that there was a significant main effect of agency
(p = 0.001) and ownership (p = 0.033), but no interaction
between the two factors (p = 0.615).
The t-map of the N100 ownership effect (defined by the
contrast of the average of Normal and Feedback-Only
against the average of Unfamiliar and Unfamiliar-Only;
Fig. 3a, middle row) had a bilateral centro-temporal neg-
ativity (tmin at C5 = -3.549) and a surrounding positivity
(tmax at F9 = 4.283). The t-map of the N100 agency effect
(as represented by the contrast of the average of Normal
and Unfamiliar against the average of Feedback-Only and
Unfamiliar-Only; Fig. 3b, middle row) had a centro-pari-
etal positivity (tmax at P4 = 4.187) and a bilateral fronto-
temporal negativity (tmin at FC6 = -3.228). (For the wave
forms, see Figure s1 and s2 in the supplementary material).
The topography of the agency effect was clearly dif-
ferent from the topography of the ownership effect (r =
-0.311, common variance = 9.6 %). Computing multi-
dimensional scaling, the effects of agency and ownership
seemed to be independent and quite orthogonal (Figure s3,
supplement).
The Late Component
Overall, the late component was generally characterized by
an occipito-parietal negativity and a bilateral frontal posi-
tivity (Fig. 2). Again, the TANOVA indicated significant
main effects of agency (p = 0.001) and ownership
(p = 0.037) but no significant interaction (p = 0.667).
Fig. 1 Temporal segmentation of the ERP components
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Fig. 2 Mean ERPs topography maps for all five but the control condition. Each color level corresponds to a step of 1 lV (Color figure online)
Fig. 3 Main effects of
ownership (a) and agency
(b) for the early, N100, and late
components
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The t-map of the effect of agency had a bilateral fronto-
temporal negativity (tmin at FT7 = -4.180) and a parieto-
occipital positivity (tmax at POz = 6.877). The t-map of the
ownership effect (tmin at F1 = -4.724, t-max at P6 = 6.566)
was very similar to the t-map of the agency effect (r = 0.838,
common variance = 70 %); effects of ownership and
agency seemed to be additive (Figure s1, supplement).
Confirmatory Analysis
To confirm previously published findings, we computed the
contrast of the Normal condition against the Feedback-Only
condition. This yielded significant TANOVA effects in the
N100 (p = 0.003) and the late component (p = 0.001), but
not in the early component. In the N100 period, the t-map
(Fig. 4) closely resembled the t-map of the N100 main effect
of agency (Fig. 3b) (r = 0.94, common variance = 88 %;
against a common variance of 2 % with the ownership effect)
(Fig. 4). In addition the result closely replicated previously
reported effects at Cz in similar experiments (Ford et al.
2001a, b), with a reduction of the N100 amplitude in the
Normal condition. In the late component, there also was a
significant effect (p = 0.001) that resembled the main
effects of agency and ownership of the above analyses.
Delay Effect
The delay effect, defined as the contrast of the Delay condi-
tion against the Normal condition showed a significant TA-
NOVA result only in the N100 (but only after normalization
of Global Field Power; p = 0.034). As in the confirmatory
analysis, the t-map of the delay effect clearly attributed the
map difference to agency (common variance = 63 %) and
not to ownership (common variance = 2 %).
Inverse Solutions
sLORETA findings were computed for the main effects of
agency and ownership in the N100 component. The results,
as shown in Fig. 5, indicated that the presence of agency
lead to a decrease of current density estimates in the
anterior cingulate cortex including the medial prefrontal
cortex (tmax = 4.26, x = 7, y = 11, z = 30), in the right
temporal cortex including the primary auditory cortex
(tmax = 3.18, x = 39, y = - 29, z = 19), and increased
current density estimates in the anterior part of the left
temporal cortex (tmax = 3.51, x = - 50, y = 5, z = -
15). Presence of ownership increased current density esti-
mates in left and right insula, left inferior frontal gyrus and
the anterior parts of the right superior temporal gyrus
(tmax = 3.08, x = 50, y = 15, z = - 25), decreased cur-
rent density estimates were observed in posterior and ros-
tral anterior cingulate and the occipital cortex (tmax = 3.28,
x = 5, y = - 90, z = 25).
Discussion
The distinction of self-generated stimuli from external
stimuli is important for an intact sense of self and is
Fig. 4 Topographies of the confirmatory analysis of the N100 suppression (a) as the contrast of the Normal against the Feedback-Only
conditions and, second, of the Delay condition (b) where the contrast between the Delay and Normal conditions is shown
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frequently affected in psychiatric conditions such as psy-
chosis. The present study examined possibly different
components of that complex mechanism by defining the
processes of agency and ownership from a behavioural/
descriptive viewpoint.
The analysis of the brain electric topography supports
that the assumed two components have two consistent and
separate biological fingerprints in the N100 period: Con-
sistent, as both components yielded a significant main
effect; and separate, as the common topographic variance
between the agency effect and the ownership effect was
only 9.6 %. Thus, ‘sensing the self’ appears to result from
at least two distinct processes: an agency assessment that
represents causality and an ownership assessment that
compares stimulus features with memory content. This
composition of the ‘sense of the self’ also has been
described in other sensory-motor systems. In a recent study
using a rubber hand, feelings of control over bodily actions
(sense of agency) and the ownership of body parts (sense of
ownership) could be behaviourally distinguished, and
possibly different underlying neuronal substrates were
discussed, paralleling our data which were gained in the
auditory and language system (Kalckert and Ehrsson
2012). The distinction between causally defined, predictive
processes and processes comparing sensory input with
memory content as different elements for a feeling of ‘‘self-
made’’ has also been highlighted in a recent hypothesis and
theory article by (Synofzik et al. 2013) who argue that only
a context-weighted integration of both yield to a reliable
feeling of being the origin of one’s actions. Our data
suggest that previous papers on central auditory N100
suppression (Ford et al. 2001a, b; Heinks-Maldonado et al.
2005) most likely represented the agency effect. This is
supported by our confirmatory analysis that replicated the
previously reported central N100 suppression and showed
that the topography of this effect was nearly identical
(88 % common variance) to the main effect of agency, but
not to the effect of ownership (2 % common variance).
Thus, our data confirmed insights from an earlier study
trying to ‘dissect corollary discharge’ in patients with
schizophrenia (Ford et al. 2007), where the greatest influ-
ence was found in the classical setting of evoking N100
during speaking. No suppression was found when subjects
heard their tape-recorded voice self-initiated by a button
press or after a visual warning. However, others have found
N100 suppression after manually self-initiated sound
stimuli and have argued for the existence of monitoring
mechanisms other than the innate efference copies (Baess
et al. 2011).
Translated to a psychological level, our data indicate
that when it comes to the processing of entire words, the
central N100 suppression primarily seems to represent the
experience of causing an external percept. In other words,
if you say a word aloud and you hear the word, the central
N100 is suppressed regardless of who is speaking.
The importance of the agency effect for the ‘sense of
self’ is further supported by the results of the Delay con-
dition. Here, the causal relation between action and effect
was altered, which again yielded an effect in the N100
topography that matched the agency effect.
z = 34 z = 15 z = -5
x = 50 x = -5 x = -56
N100 agency effect
N100 ownership effect
-3.00t
3.00t
-2.17t
2.17t
Fig. 5 Significant N100 effects of agency and ownership in the inverse space. Red areas indicate larger current density estimates under the
presence of agency/ownership, blue areas indicate more current density in the absence of agency/ownership (Color figure online)
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Classically a reduction of the N100 during reading has
been attributed to corollary discharge resulting from ef-
ference copies of motor commands. This is a common
mechanism in humans and animals (Crapse and Sommer
2008). In healthy controls, the largest suppression, and thus
smallest N100 amplitudes, are reported for conditions
identical to our Normal condition (subject speaks and
consequently hears a sound in his/her voice) (Curio et al.
2000; Houde et al. 2002). Responses to self-produced
speech were weaker than responses to tape-recorded
speech. Further, responses to tones also were weaker dur-
ing speech production when compared to responses to
tones recorded in the presence of speech from tape play-
back. These data suggest that during speech production, the
auditory cortex attenuates its sensitivity and modulates its
activity as a function of the expected acoustic feedback
(Houde et al. 2002). In studies with patients with schizo-
phrenia, the expected suppression in a normal speaking
condition was missing or strongly reduced (Ford et al.
2001ab; Heinks-Maldonado et al. 2007).
The later ERP component seemed to integrate the sense
of agency and ownership. The observation that the t-maps
of the effects of agency and ownership were very similar
(70 % common variance) suggests that both factors con-
tribute to the component in an additive way. Maybe this
mirrors a more general mechanism to process unexpected
events. In the literature on corollary discharge, to our
knowledge, only the N100 effects were described without
statistical consideration of the later effects.
In contrast to earlier studies in the field of ERP mea-
surement of auditory self-monitoring, we used entire words
(nouns) instead of syllables (Heinks-Maldonado et al.
2005, 2007). This decision was led by our intention to
investigate, in subsequent experiments, the mechanisms of
identifying stimuli as coming from the self or not in
patients with schizophrenia prone to auditory verbal hal-
lucinations. Classically, auditory hallucinations comprise
full words, often with semantic or emotional content
(Mccarthy-Jones et al. 2012). Therefore, in the behavioural
studies of self-monitoring without ERP measurements,
emotional words (e.g. adjectives) have been used (Johns
and Mcguire 1999). The argument for using emotional
words is the idea that auditory verbal hallucinations often
include emotional content (Mccarthy-Jones et al. 2012). As
we aimed to segregate the different electrophysiological
processes regarding agency and ownership, we removed
the emotional valence to reduce potential confounding
variables. An undesired consequence of using words
instead of syllables in electrophysiological studies—which
may have prevented others from using this methodology—
is movement artefacts. We controlled for movement arte-
facts by subtracting the Read-Aloud-Only (i.e. speech
without listening) control condition from these conditions
with the potential speaking artefact (Normal, Unfamiliar,
Delay). The topography of our word-evoked N100 was
according to N100-literature and had a central negativity,
resembling the N100 topography of a syllable (Eichele
et al. 2005) or the most commonly used beep tone stimuli
(Hubl et al. 2007). Finally, the word evoked N100 repli-
cated the well-described N100 suppression when agency
was present (Fig. 4a, left side).
A byproduct of removing speaking artefacts by sub-
tracting the Read-Aloud-Only condition was that feed-for-
ward mechanisms also were removed. Thus, all analysed
ERPs represented only auditory processing. In former
studies (Heinks-Maldonado et al. 2005, 2007), in the
respective speaking condition, the feed-forward mecha-
nisms still were included.
Further, expanding the present literature in the field, we
statistically analysed the topographical effects. In the con-
firmatory analysis of the central N100 suppression (Fig. 4a)
the topography of the suppressed N100 had bilateral tem-
poral minima with a slightly stronger pronunciation on the
left, speech-dominant hemisphere, corresponding to the
figures as presented in an earlier study (Heinks-Maldonado
et al. 2007). This likely is due to the corollary discharge
invoked by the efference copy in the speaking condition
(Normal) following the articulation of a word, which is
missing in the listening condition (Feedback-Only). Since
the unsuppressed N100 evoked by the listening condition
had the typical central negativity, the difference map had
strongest amplitudes along the midline. In contrast, in the
topography of the ownership effect, main differences in the
N100 component lay not along the midline but bilateral
temporal (Fig. 3a). Thus, the topography contributes sig-
nificantly to our understanding of the differential neuro-
biological processes and the topographic analysis extends
the literature on self-monitoring in healthy subjects.
There is, to our knowledge, no literature on electrical
source imaging in the field of ‘‘sensing the self’’, even not
in the broader scope of what we defined as agency and
ownership. Therefore, we compared our ERP source esti-
mates of the current density with the neuroimaging results
gained from mainly fMRI studies. There are some imaging
studies in healthy controls (Fu et al. 2006) or even
schizophrenia patients, who are prone to hallucinations
(Allen et al. 2007), where a paradigm comparable to our
ownership effect was used: own voice and alien voice were
administered via headphones after reading aloud. Activa-
tions in the bilateral insular as well as in the temporal
(including the anterior parts) cortex were described (Fu
et al. 2006), which is comparable with our findings. We
observed this increase in current density predominantly in
the right hemisphere, which again is in accordance with the
right sided increase when hearing the own voice in com-
parison to hearing an unfamiliar voice (Fu et al. 2006).
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Additionally we found decreased current density estimates
in the cortical midline structures, which were also reported
by Fu et al. (2006): they found especially the posterior
located midline structures to be more activated when
hearing the unfamiliar voice. Finally, we observed an
increase in the current density estimates in the left inferior
frontal gyrus, which might be a correlate of the reading
component in our paradigm (Fiez and Petersen 1998). In an
interesting study in hallucinating schizophrenia patients,
exactly these cingulate regions exhibited a negative cor-
relation between the hallucination-related coupling of the
left inferior frontal gyrus and the posterior and rostral
anterior cingulate cortex in dependency of the reality of
auditory hallucinations (Raij et al. 2009). On the perceptual
level, this is in parts comparable with our paradigm, where
we observed this decrease when the unfamiliar voices
where replayed.
In the second contrast agency? versus agency- the
regions with increased current density estimates in the
presence of agency indicated an involvement of structures
being affected by having caused an action, here, in reading
the read word (irrespective of hearing the own or an
unfamiliar voice). We identified decreased activation of the
anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex, when the
subject was the cause of the percept. This is nicely in
accordance with the literature on error monitoring (Van
Veen and Carter 2002) and other paradigms challenging
the self-monitoring system—independent of the modalities
e.g. also while tickling oneself, which is anchored in the
motor-sensory system (Blakemore et al. 2000). In addition,
in healthy controls, functional connectivity between the
medial prefrontal cortex and the temporal gyrus was found
to increase when other-compared to self-generated words
were processed. Schizophrenia patients showed an inverse
pattern (Wang et al. 2011). The loss of the feeling of
agency (in a motor-sensory study) was related to bilateral
but right accented temporal activations (Nahab et al. 2011),
which confirms our right temporal finding of decreased
current density estimates with the loss of being the actor.
As a limitation of the present study and as an outlook on
possible follow-ups, one may in addition assess the
behavioural effects of agency and ownership. Furthermore,
it may be interesting to look at EEG gamma synchroniza-
tion (Kottlow et al. 2012), since this has been related to
impaired corollary discharge mechanisms in patients with
schizophrenia (Koenig et al. 2012). A further limitation
might be the masking of potential interesting effects by the
motor movement artefacts, which have been removed by
subtracting the ‘‘Read-Aloud-Only’’ condition. However,
since the ERP that might have been confounded by speech
related artefacts displayed the typical topography of audi-
tory components, we assume that such residual artefacts
have not played a relevant role in our analyses.
Self-monitoring is a complex process with at least two
main components: agency and ownership. These compo-
nents are neurobiologically distinct processes. Our results
support previous findings and extend our knowledge of the
mechanisms to establish the ‘sense of self’ for spoken
words. The classical central N100 suppression is deter-
mined by the agency effect, while ownership yields bilat-
eral temporal differences. This finding may be relevant to
the study of symptom clusters in schizophrenia, which are
partly characterized by a deficient’sense of self’ (e.g. ver-
bal hallucinations, ego-disturbances such as thought
insertion and withdrawal, or feelings of being made). We
suggest that loss of agency alone may lead to symptoms of
ego-disturbances. Additionally, if ownership is affected,
hallucination-type symptoms may result.
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